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MANAGING  THE  GREAT  LAKES  COMMONS:  AN  EVALUATION
OF RECENT INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES
Stephen Frerichs
and K. William Easter'
The Great Lakes are a common property resource2. Historically, water
in the Great Lakes has been an open access, free good.  With increasing
demands, however, quality water has become, in an economic sense, scarce.
The realization that supplies of Great Lakes water may be limited, coupled
with  several recent judicial decisions regarding the legality of water as
a tradeable commodity, have created a growing political awareness of the
importance of Great Lakes water resources.  This phenomenon is particularly
observable at the state political level 3 .
State governments have historically managed water under state police
powers and developed water resources as they were needed.  Now, unsure
whether a state can prohibit interstate water sales, states are moving to
'The authors are Sea Grant Legislative Intern and professor in the
Department of Agricultural  and Applied Economics respectively.  We would
like to thank M.L. Livingston, Edward D. Lotterman and Kieth Kozloff for
their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this report.
2For this paper, a common property resource is defined as a resource
shared by a group of producers and/or consumers.  Exclusion from the
resource is difficult and beyond some level of user-resource interaction,
additional users will adversely effect resource use of others.  The eight
Great Lake states are:  Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New York,
Ohio  and  Pennsylvania.  The  Canadian  provinces  are  Quebec  and  Ontario.
3See  for  instance the decisions:  Sporhase vs.  Nebraska 1982,  El  Paso
vs.  Reynolds  1983 and Colorado vs.  New Mexico  1982.
Iprotect water supplies for future development.  A new attitude of  "bring
the  people  and  industry  to  the  water  rather  than  the  water  to  them"
prevails.  This  has  led  to strong misgiving and  inflexibility  about
interstate  and  interbasin  water  transfers.  (Howe,  1985)  Often  proposals
are rejected not for efficiency implications or regional  impacts but on the
notion  of  setting  a  bad precedent.  The Great  Lakes basin  and  the  Great
Lakes  states  and  provinces  have  been  no  exception  to  this  trend.
Concern for protecting the Great Lakes basin from unwanted interbasin
transfers,  particularly  southwestward,  is  the  impetus  behind  the  newest
Great  Lakes basin compact, the  Great  Lakes  Charter  of  1985,  and  U.S.  Public
Law 99-662.  Both the Charter and Public Law create new management rules
for the Great Lakes basin.  The Charter establishes rules of access and
conduct between states/provinces and between states and water users for
water withdrawals and new or increased diversions and consumptive uses.  In
contrast, the Public Law assures the Great Lakes states that U.S. federal
authority for an interbasin diversion will not be granted without the Great
Lakes states consultation and approval.
This report will analyze the common management rules promulgated for
the Great Lakes by the Great Lakes Charter.  The new management rules will
be analyzed to determine if management goals have a chance of being
realized and what role implementation plays in the process of goal
achievement.
2The Great Lakes Basin
An introduction to the Great Lakes would not be complete without
reference to the abundance of water in the Great Lakes basin.  General
remarks regarding the vastness of the Great Lakes include:
* The Lakes contain 20% of the world's supply of  'fresh  surface water
and 95%  of the U.S. fresh surface water supply (Task Force, 1985).
* The lakes contain enough water to flood the entire U.S. to a depth of
10  feet (Massey, 1985).
* Water retention of the Lakes varies from 191 years in Lake Superior to
less than three years in Lake Erie  (Donahue  et al.  1986).
Hydrologically,  the Great Lakes are composed of five lakes:  Superior,
Michigan,  Huron,  Erie  and  Ontario,  which  flow  in  a  stairstep  manner
eastward  through  the  St.  Lawrence Seaway  to the  Atlantic  Ocean.  Large  by
any standard, the Lakes have relatively small but stable outflows. The
small outflows combined with the vast surface area and large retention
capacity of the Lakes drastically ameliorate short term lake level
fluctuations  (on average one to two feet per year)  (IJC, 1985).  Most Lake
level  fluctuations occur naturally, humans regulate only two of the Lakes
outflows,  Lake  Superior at Sault  St.  Marie  and  Lake  Ontario  at the  Moses
Saunders  Power  Dam.  Other  human  lake  level  influences  come  in  the  form  of
consumptive  uses  and diversions.4
Currently five diversions effect the Great Lakes basin.  Two  flow  into
Lake Superior from the James Bay river basin at Long Lake and Ogoki,
Canada.  One flows out of Lake Michigan at Chicago down the Chicago River
4An  interbasin transfer  (diversion)  will be defined  as  a  transfer  of
water  from  the  Great  Lakes  Basin into  another  river  basin and  a  consumptive
use  as  that portion  of  water  withdrawn  or withheld  from  the  Great  Lakes
Basin and assumed to be lost or otherwise not returned to the basin (Task
Force  1985).
3and eventually into the Mississippi River.  Another, the Welland Canal,
diverts water around the Niagara Falls from Lake Erie to Lake Ontario.  The
final diversion,  the  New York State Barge Canal,  is an intrabasin
diversion.
Consumptive  uses,  unlike diversions, tend to be small and not easily
identifiable.  Consumptive uses include;  water for manufacturing,
municipal purposes, irrigation, mining, power production and cooling
purposes.  Impacts on lake levels of individual consumptive uses tend to be
small, however, considered cumulatively the lake level impacts are
significant.
Limits  on  State  Police  Power
From  a  management  perspective,  Great  Lakes  states  had  assumed  that
under the  state's police  power  a  state could  prohibit  or  regulate
interstate transfers of water.  However recent judicial decisions have
changed  this assumption.  The  Supreme  Court  ruled  in Sporhase v.  Nebraska
ex rel.  Douglas 1982 that  ground water  is  an  article  of  commerce  and
subject to the commerce  clause  of  the U.S.  Constitution.  As  a  result
Nebraska could not forbid the transfer of ground water across its state
line.  In the Colorado v. New  Mexico case, which dealt with a dispute over
the Vermejo River, an interstate stream, the Supreme Court held that the
doctrine of equitable apportionment governs interstate streams (Utton
1983).  The E1  Paso v.  New  Mexico case upheld the Sporhase decision and
struck down a New Mexico prohibition of water exports.  Thus it appears
that any attempt by the Great Lakes states to legislatively embargo
4interbasin water transfers would be held in conflict with the U.S. commerce
clause.
The  Sporhase decision established four guidelines to evaluate the
constitutionality of a state statute that restricts interstate ground water
transfers.  They are:  1)  the statute must have a legitimate  local purpose,
2) the statute must regulate intra- and interstate diversions
"evenhandedly", 3) local benefits must exceed the costs imposed on
interstate commerce and 4) no less discriminating alternative against
interstate  commerce  should  exist  (Massey,  1985).
Decisions  in  the  Sporhase case did, however, allow the opportunity for
a state to protect against unwanted diversions through legislative
management.  To unilaterally protect against undesired withdrawals, states
could enact statewide water management programs that make preservation of
state waters an integral part of the program (Tarlock, 1986).  To achieve
this a state must:
1)  develop a comprehensive water allocation plan for a reasonable time
period.  This can be done under the state's police power,
2) tie applications  for all new major water uses to allocation
priorities established in the plan, and
3) assert power to deny any water use allocations which are not
consistent with the plan.  (Tarlock, 1986)
A state may then deny a present water use application to reserve water for
future needs (Tarlock, 1986).  This form of legislative management requires
the establishment of a state planning authority.
The Sporhase decision considered health and welfare of a states
citizenry as a legitimate purpose to prohibit interstate transfers, but
protection for economic purposes was not deemed legitimate.  (Massey, 1985)
5Also, the "evenhandedness" principle of the Sporhase court decision plays a
vital role in restricting  what rules can be used to limit transfers out of
the Great Lakes basin.  Transfers within a riparian state must be treated
the same as transfers out of basin to nonriparian states5 .
Prior to the signing of the Great Lakes Charter four of the eight
Great Lakes states established access rules for diversion out of the Great
Lakes.  Minnesota regulates any surface water appropriation in excess of
10,000 gallons per day (gpd) or 1,000,000 gallons per year through its
statewide water permitting system.  The permits are required for any ground
or surface water appropriation;  Minnesota is the only basin state with
such a comprehensive water management system.  Ohio and Indiana, both, have
water embargo laws prohibiting diversions of Great Lakes water out of
state.  These are in the same spirit as the Nebraska law at issue in the
Sporhase decision.  Ohio also requires a permit for any water diversion in
excess of 100,000 gpd out of Lake Erie.  Illinois regulates the Chicago
Diversion, by Supreme Court decree, at 3200 cfs.  A permit and conservation
program exists to allocate the 3200 cfs among  Illinois users.  Illinois
also prohibits water diversions from Lake Michigan for use outside Illinois
without prior consent of all other Great Lakes states and the International
Joint Commission (IJC)  (Michigan Lake Level Act of 1984).
Access Rules
The Great Lakes Charter (1985) and Public Law 99-662  (1987) establish
rules of access to Great Lakes water for diversions and consumptive uses.
The Charter's management objectives are:
5None of the Great Lakes states is completely  within  the  basin.
6"...  to conserve the levels and flows of the Great Lakes ... to
protect and conserve ... the Great Lakes Basin  ecosystem ... to
provide for cooperative programs and management of the water resources
of the Great Lakes Basin  ... to make secure and protect present
developments within the region;  and to provide  ... for future
investment and development in the region."  (Task Force 1985)
The Charter is based on  five principles:  1) Integrity of the Great Lakes
Basin, 2) Cooperation among Jurisdictions,  3) Protection of the Water
Resources of the Great Lakes, 4) Prior Notice and Consultation and 5)
Cooperative Programs and Practices  (Task Force, 1985).
The first principle, integrity of the Great Lakes basin, establishes
the political recognition that the Great Lakes basin must be considered and
managed as a unified system.  Recognizing that the basin transcends
political boundaries, the second principle, establishes the need for
cooperation in management, i.e.,  common management rules.  The third
principle defines the attitude or orientation of the management approach.
"It  is the  intent of the signatory states and provinces that
diversions of Basin water resources will not be allowed if
individually or cumulatively they would have any significant adverse
impacts on lake levels, in-basin uses, and the Great Lakes Ecosystem."
(Task Force, 1985)
The fourth and fifth principles establish how the first three are to be
accomplished.  The prior notice and consultation (PNC) rule requires any
state or province to consult and seek consent of all affected states and
provinces prior to approving any major new diversion or consumptive use of
Great Lakes water.  The cooperative programs and practices  (Principle 5)
are the development of a common data base for basin water use and the
7creation of a Water Resources Management Committee (WRMC) to develop a
Great Lakes water resources management program.6
In February of 1987, the WRMC published its recommendation for
management.  Data collection is to be organized by water use category and
aggregated by sub-basin7 (WRMC report 1987).  The WRMC found a wide
variation between states regarding actual data collected and the state's
authority to collect data.  Few of the states collect water use data in all
nine categories specified by the WRMC.  A trigger level of 100,000 gallons
per day in any thirty day average was set as a minimum water withdrawal
required for data collection
The WRMC also established guidelines for the prior notice and
consultation process  (PNC).  The participation requirements for the PNC
process  are  the authority:  1) to register  any  withdrawal  in excess of
100,000 gpd,  2) to regulate any withdrawal in excess of 2  million gpd in
any 30 day period, and 3)  to notify all other affected states of a
consumptive use or diversion in excess of 5  million gpd in any 30 day
period.  Few of the basin states had the capability to register or regulate
any water withdrawal at these trigger levels prior to 1983.  In order to
institute these regulations a state must pass enabling legislation.  The
intent of the Charter's cosigners is for each state/province to
legislatively implement the PNC and the water data collection processes,
6The WRMC is composed of representatives appointed by each governor
and premier of the Great Lakes states and provinces.  The committee was
charged with developing and implementing procedures for the water use data
collection system and the prior notice and consultation procedure.
7Categories are:  public water supply, domestic self-supplied,
irrigation, industrial, commercial self-supplied, mining, agriculture,
thermoelectric and hydroelectric power.  (WRMC report 1987)
8making the non-binding compact legally binding through each state/province
legislature.
Basin state congressmen also proposed bills in Congress to protect
basin interests from interstate diversions.  Although the language of the
bills was later changed to interbasin diversion, the end result was P.L.
99-662.  The Public Law prohibits any sized interbasin water diversion from
the Great Lakes, unless such diversion is approved by the governor of each
Great Lakes state (Omnibus Water-Projects Bill,  1987).  The law also
prohibits any federal agency from studying interbasin diversion from the
Great Lakes basin.
The Public Law would appear to override the Charter, making it moot.
However, the goals and objectives of the Charter and the Public Law are
different.  The Charter seeks to establish rules for all water withdrawals
out of the Great Lakes while the Public Law regulates only diversions out
of the basin.8  The legality of the Public Law may also be questionable.
One of the reasons purported for the law is adverse economic impacts, which
the Supreme Court has decreed as insufficient reasoning to discriminate
against  interstate  water  diversions9 .
In  summary, two  legal decisions,  Sporhase and El Paso are the decisive
impetus  behind  the  new  management  rules for  the  Great  Lakes.  Sporhase and
El Paso establish  guidelines  for  legislative  management  of  the  state water
8The term  "diversion"  was  not defined  in  the bill.
9Although  an  interbasin  transfer  out of  the  Great  Lakes  need  not  be
interstate,  the  interests  of  the  basin  states  in  keeping  basin  water  in
their jurisdictions  to collect  associated secondary benefits could
reasonably  lead  one  to  expect  unanimous  consent will  be  more  readily
granted  to those  interbasin  transfers  remaining  within  the basin  states
than  to  those  leaving  the basin states.
9resources.  Also, the court decision establishes criteria that the
management rules must follow.  Particularly of interest to the Great Lakes
Basin is the "evenhandedness principle" which means all  interbasin
diversions must be treated alike, whether intra- or interstate.
The Great  Lakes  Charter  was  signed  in  1985  by  all  Great  Lakes
states/provinces.  The  Charter  creates  a  regional  data  collection  agency
and  rules  to  manage  Great  Lakes  diversions  and consumptive  uses.  The U.S.
Public Law 99-662 pertains only to the Great Lakes states and grants each
state a veto power over any new diversion out of the basin.  The Great
Lakes are a commons that transcends  jurisdictional boundaries.  The theory
of open access, comnmon property resources is presented next as a model for
analyzing  the  new  management  rules.
THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF OPEN ACCESS, COMMON PROPERTY,
AND THE ROLE OF MANAGEMENT RULES
The  classic  "common property" problem  characterizes  a  resource  for
which  property  rights  are not  clearly  defined,  causing  a  disjunction
between individual and collective rationality.  This disjunction, combined
with nonseparable adverse externalities' 0 tieing the decisions and welfare
of  each  individual  resource  user  to other  users,  can  lead  to
overinvestment,  exploitation  and  eventual  degradation  of  the  resource.
Examples of common property resources are:  air, fishing grounds,  oil and
water pools, radio frequencies and outer space.
'0Externalities will be defined where the utility of an individual
resource user is  influenced by a vector of activities under the
individual's control and also by activities under the control of other
resource users (noncompensated interdependencies),  (Randall 1983).
10For a common property, use and access rights may not  be defined, (a
res nullis right structure) or rights may be well defined for a group of
users,  (a  res communes right structure)  (Ciracy-Wantrup and Bishop 1975,
Howe 1979).  Ownership under res communes  rights are generally vested in
some form of collective, where access and use rights are established to
mitigate overinvestment and overexploitation of the resource.  Resource
exploitation, however, is pervasive to  res nullis resources.  Whereas a res
communes resource with well defined and implemented use rights, generally
does not experience overuse.
In mathematical terms, N exploiters with cost function c  (Ei ) exist,
where  Ei  is some standard amount of effort required to withdraw one unit of
water".  If each exploiter faces an identical production function  for
withdrawals, Wi =f(L,Ei ), such that withdrawals are a function  of effort  and
lake levels  (L),  a water mass conversion factor, then given a value for
water, p ,  each appropriator maximizes short term profit x:
max  pf(L,E  )  - ci  (  )
This occurs when the water withdrawer equates marginal revenues to marginal
costs  or:
(3.1)  8c-  (E  )=p 8  (L,E,)
This equilibrium, however, is not a socially acceptable equilibrium because
of the nonseparable externalities accruing as a result of withdrawing water
from the Lakes.  A social optimum would be:
" The following mathematical model closely resembles Conrad and
Clark's  fisheries  model  in  Notes  and  Problems  in  Resource  Economics  1987,
particularly  pages  130-134.  Effort will  be broadly  defined  to  encompass
pumping  and transporting  of water.
11ja>  -at  I  -
max  e  Si  pf(L,Ei )  - a,  (El)  dt
subject to:  L=F(L)-  i  f(L,Ei )
where a is the social discount rate, F(L) is the renewal rate of water
into the Lakes and L is the change in lake levels.  The constraint simply
states that the change in the levels must equal the Lake renewal rate minus
the withdrawal rate. The corresponding current value Hamiltonian is:
H= Si  [  pf<LEi )  - c (E ) ] - (t) [  F(L) - .f(L,EI )  ]
where the necessary conditions include 8H/8Ei =0, or in terms of the above
equation:
p i  (L Ei )-  (Ei)- 8  (LE  ) =0
or
(3.2)  E-(Ei)  = [p-0]  8f  (L,E  )
where 6 is the marginal value of water to society or the shadow price of
water.  It is assumed that 9 is positive, however, during periods of very
high Lake levels a case could be made for a negative 8.
A comparison of equations  (3.1) and (3.2)  shows that more effort is
exerted by individual maximizers (3.1)  relative to the desired amount of
the cooperative/social optimum  (3.2).  The increased effort translates  into
overinvestment and overwithdrawal of water from the basin.  If the value of
water to the appropriators can be reduced by 0, a reduction in withdrawals
to a social optimum level should follow.
12Changing Individual Expectations
The tendency to overexploit  res nullis resources when use or access
restrictions to internalize adverse externalities do not exist,
demonstrates the need for access or use rules (taxes, withdrawal standards
or quotas, private property rights, etc).  Any rules proposed for res
nullis resources should be designed to affect the rate of resource use and
entry and exit conditions  (access) to the resource and the distribution of
returns from the use of the resource.  These rules must be formulated so
that  they  change  the rate  of  resource  use  or  access  by  restructuring  the
expectations  of  individual  resource  users  with  respect  to the  rate of  use
or  access  by other  users  (Runge,  1981).  The formulation  must be done  so
that adverse externalities  associated with resource  use are  internalized.
In other words, the individual or firm generating an adverse externality
must take  into account its  full cost, i.e.,  internalize the cost.
Implicitly or explicitly, by internalizing the externalities some
management goal for the commons is recognized:  conservation, preservation,
maximum sustainable yield, etc.  The management objective will associate
with it some ideal rate of resource use over time.  To structure the rate
of resource use overtime, individual user expectations of what other users
are or will be doing must be determined.
Manipulating the expectations of the resource users, recognizes the
function of rules,  i.e.,  forming the expectations of an individual
concerning the behavior of others.  For common property, which is affected
over time by individual use rates, contributions to a social management
goal will depend on whether the individual expects other users to
contribute to the goal as well (assurance).  A jointness of supply exists
13when an individual chooses to contribute to the management goal of the
commons.  That is, when an individual chooses to contribute, by stinting on
his/her rate of resource use, others will benefit, i.e.,  experience
nonseparable externalities  (Runge, 1981).
The decision to use the resource in an efficient manner is dependent
on the expectation of what other users will do.  Contributions will vary
between individuals where contributions are a function of the information
available to the individual user concerning the action of other users
(Mueller, 1981;  Runge, 1981).  Information concerning the behavior of
others, or an estimate of the behavior of others will be a function of the
co  ns  institutional  rules  and the  expected  commonspliance of other users to
those rulesl 2.
To demonstrate the importance of rules in expectation formation, let
P, be a subjective probability attached by individual j to the possibility
that others will withdraw at some net level i.13  Also assume that
individual j faces the same choices as all other users along a continuum
bounded by the decision on one end to freeride  (not contribute to the
management goal)  or to stint (contribute fully to the commons' management
goal).  Stinting is considered to be a contribution, which can be thought
of as a cost to individual j.  Contributions by j to the management goal
may range from 0, no contribution or freeriding, to n, complete
2 zObviously, compliance will be a function of the degree of coercive
rule enforcement, the more enforcement, the larger the compliance by
individuals.  Economic theory and Western culture, however, agree that
individual liberty and individual choice is preferred to "state control"
(Bromley 1986).  Minimum enforcement is preferred, i.e.,  rules should be
structured such that voluntary exchange and cooperation mitigate resource overuse.
'3This model and notation closely follow and are adapted from Runge 1981.
14contribution.  If the withdrawal pressure on the resource by all other
users is known,  and ranges from a value of 0,  which represents complete
resource depletion, to k, which indicates full management objective
attainment, then individual j's contribution, a function of the
expectations of what others contribute, can be represented by the matrix in
Table 1.
In the matrix the cost and benefits of each alternative joint action
are expressed in terms of utility.  Net benefits to the individual
withdrawing water from the Great Lakes equals the utility obtain from the
consumption and/or production of goods and services related to water
withdrawals minus the cost of abiding by the rules.
The columns of the matrix, 0 through k, indicate the range of possible
contributions to the management goal of the commons which j expects of
others.  The probabilities at the bottom of each column correspond to the
expected level  (by  j) of the possible contribution of others.  The rows
represent the range of possible contributions of individual j from 0 to n.
Assume d to be the level of contribution by j,  when j expects others to
contribute at the ith level.  Since j's contribution is thought of as a
cost to j, the outcome for j in utility terms is Ud+i  -Cd.  This represents
the net benefits to j given the ith contributions by others and the dth
contribution  by  j  (resulting  in  cost of  Cd  for  j).
The expected utility for j of each alternative level of withdrawing is
the  summation  of payoffs  across  each  row.  For  example  at d,  expected
utility  Ud  equals:
Ud=(Ud  -Cd)Po  +  (Ud+1  -Cd)P1  +  ...  +  (Ud+i  -Cd)Pi  +...  +(Ud+k  -Cd)Pl.
15or  |
Uda  i=0(Ud+i )P,  -Cd
Assuming j desires to maximize his/her expected utility, j will
continue to contribute to the management goal as long as 8Ud  > 0 and will
stop contributing when 8Ud  =0  (assuming Pt and C are continuous and the
second order conditions hold).
Given a commons' management objective,  the role of the access rule(s)
is to structure the interdependent expectations and utility functions of
the individual users such that amounts contributed allow full attainment of
the management objective.  Ideally, the rules will structure positive
expectations among users over time, i.e.,  positive expectations of
reciprocity with a minimal need for external enforcement.  Reciprocal
expectations,  (if I contribute you will do likewise),  can only be
established over time through user interaction.  Reciprocity is not an
immediate quid pro quo transaction (Oakerson, 1986).  Reciprocity will
create expectations of assurance among individual users.  This assurance,
that others will contribute, is a function of the rules.
Runge  (1985) hypothesizes three decisions when innovating a
restrictive rule for a res nullis  common property resource:  (1) the
decision of which rule to institute to restrict use,  (2) the decision to
abide by the rule, and (3)  the decision to continue to abide by the rule
over time.  An important step between decision one and two that is often
overlooked is the implementation of the decision rule.  Once a decision on
the access rule has been formulated, it must be effectively implemented
before  it can effect the decisions of users.  Rule implementation will
effect both decisions (2) and  (3) and could be the weak link in the
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Pkmanagement process of implementing  rules as the commons moves towards res
communes management.  To establish whether implementation is indeed a weak
link, a theory of implementation will be employed to analyze the commons
management rules as they are being implemented across the Great Lakes.
THE THEORY OF IMPLEMENTATION OF WATER MANAGEMENT RULES
Given the historical water management perspective of the Great Lakes
states and the notion that the Federal Government may not be sympathetic to
the Great Lakes basin interests  (or rather more inclined to Western state
interests)  in applying commerce clause rules of trade;  riparian state
government officials decided that they must move to protect their own
interests.  In addition, with the constraints imposed by Sporhase v.
Nebraska and El Paso v. Reynolds, any access rules to Great Lakes basin
water must be applied "evenhandedly".  The solution to this problem is,  in
part, one of implementing a "evenhanded" policy consistently across all
eight states.  However, a number of problems exist in implementing the
policy and achieving policy objectives.
These problems emerge as government officials attempt to accomplish
the objectives set forth in the Great Lakes charter.  When policy outcomes
do not resemble the original intentions of the policy makers,
implementation becomes an issue.  A crucial question is what factors have
affected the attainment (or lack thereof) of the original policy
objectives.  Implementation analysis provides the conceptual framework for
identifying these factors and for evaluating the implementation of the
access rules across the Great Lakes states.
18A Framework for Evaluation
Any model or framework for analysis of implementation should organize
information into patterns that are readily used and approximate the system
as a whole.  The framework needs to:  (1)  be dynamic to analyze the
implementation of management rule changes for an open access resource,  (2)
capture the characteristics of the resource and the institutional structure
affecting access to the resource, and (3)  establish normative criteria for
successful implementation of proposed rule changes.  The criteria may be
thought of as necessary but not sufficient conditions for effective
implementation.
The basic framework or model consists of seven components.  Two are
descriptive in nature and five are analytical/normative.  The model assumes
that  it is possible to distinguish between policy makers, policy
implementors, and those affected by the policy (target groups).  Making
these distinctions allows one to differentiate between the responsibilities
of policy makers and policy implementors and their distinct duties.  Table
2 shows the components in a flow diagram.
The two descriptive components, the sociopolitical environmental  and
the resource/target group characteristics are intended to capture
attributes which effect the technical and physical aspects of the
resource.  The attributes are more descriptive  in nature as they tend to
define the natural boundaries of the problem.  The five
analytical/normative components that form the heart of the analysis are:
the formation of institutional arrangements, implementation of
institutional arrangements, the outputs of the implementing agencies, the
decision to abide by the new arrangements, and the outputs of the
19institutional arrangements.  They can be broadly likened to policy
formation, policy implementation and policy outputs.
The Sociopolitical Environment Element
The sociopolitical environment involves attributes that compose the
setting within which any decision making arrangement  is implemented.
Environmental effects are broad and affect all other model components.
Aspects of the environmental element include:  socioeconomic conditions,
prior institutional arrangements, public and political support, and the
amount of media coverage.
Variation in socioeconomic conditions may effect the perception of the
relative importance of the problem being addressed  (Sabatier and Mazmanian,
1981).  A resource price shift or a shift in the relative economic
importance of a target group may diminish the need for a change in the
institutional arrangements or induce an institutional change  (Ruttan,
1978).  A policy susceptible to changes in socioeconomic conditions must
have flexibility incorporated within it to adjust to these changes.  For
example, access rules for water withdrawals out of the Great Lakes must
recognize that lake levels fluctuate.  The fluctuation of the lake levels
will be correlated to the value of withdrawing water from the lake.  At
lower lake levels, the costs of withdrawing water may be exorbitantly high,
whereas at higher lake levels there may be little or no cost involved in
withdrawing water and, in fact, the action may be beneficial.
Prior institutional arrangements affecting the commons or related to
the commnons must also be identified.  Changes or variation in these
20arrangements, like changes in socioeconomic conditions, may induce the
needfor management changes.  Inadequate institutional arrangements may be
the cause of many management problems.  For a commons, institutional
arrangements should foster collective action and internalize externalities
(Easter, 1986).
Public and political support for rule changes is also crucial for the
policy to get to its implementation phase.  Support will be influenced by
socioeconomic conditions, and also by media coverage.  The media links
changes in the socioeconomic conditions to public and political opinions.
Public opinions affect the political agenda and can change the
implementation of a policy.
Resource/Target Group Characteristics
The resource and target group characteristics are inherent in any
common property problem.  Both the physical and technical features must be
clearly described.  In addition, the target group size and diversity, the
need for requisite technology, the rivalry vs. nonrivalry in resource use,
and the degree of exclusion in resource use'4 all need to be specified.
The more diverse or larger the target group, the more difficult it will be
to implement the management rule.  Without the requisite technology it may
be impossible to meet program objectives.  Thus information concerning the
resource and target groups is essential  for the analysis of program
implementation.
14The definition of rivalry and exclusivity follow Randall  1979.
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IThe Formation of Institutional Arrangements
Institutional arrangements structure individual and collective
behavior with respect to the commons  (Runge, 1981; Oakerson, 1986).
Institutional arrangements are the  "rules of the game".  The rules dictate
human behavior and help formulate expectations of the actions of others.
Normatively, economic rules should coordinate behavior to increase benefits
associated with economic behavior and ought to reduce uncertainty in human
interactions  (Runge, 1985).  Common's rules need not be formalized to
exist.  They can be cultural or traditional rules.  For the purposes of
this report the rules or proposed changes in the rules for the Great Lakes
will be considered as given by the Great Lakes Charter and P.L. 99-662.
Ideally, commons' rules should represent a management objective, e.g.,
conservation or preservation of the resource.  The management objective
must be linked to the rules via an appropriate causal theory (Sabatier and
Mazmanian,  1981).  The objectives of the rules are important to the
implementation process.  A need to identify the objectives in order to know
how or what to implement is self-evident.  If multiple objectives are
contained in the policy directive, concise ranking of the relative
objectives should be established along with a decision rule for each
objective (Taff  and Runge,  1986).  Precise and clear objectives aid in
program evaluation, and provide implementors a resource to fall back on
when adversities are met during the implementation phase  (Sabatier and
Mazmanian, 1981).
23Implementation of Institutional Arrangements
The fourth model component, implementation of institutional
arrangements, assumes that a distinction between those who implement and
those who use the resource exists.  If no such distinction exists, this and
the next section may be omitted and the framework collapses to Runge's
three hypothetical decisions.  However, in the case of a large diverse
group, some type of implementing agency distinct from users is more apt to
exist, particularly when interjurisdictional enforcement is required, e.g.,
air pollution.
The analysis of this component focuses on  the who and the how of the
implementation  process.  The  who includes  identification  and  analysis  of
the disposition,  attitudes,  commitment, financial  resources  and
organizational  capabilities  of  the  implementors.
Any agency  will  tend  to develop  general  orientations  to  problems  and
it may be slow to change these orientations  (Easter, 1986, Sabatier and
Mazmanian, 1981).  Ensuring that the implementors are disposed or committed
to the management objectives will facilitate more successful and consistent
implementation.  This can be accomplished either by creating a new agency
to implement the policy changes or by assigning the task to an established
agency with a known predisposition to the policy goals.  The disposition or
attitudes of the implementors can be conceived as aspects of the utility
function of the implementors.
Organizational capabilities and financial resources of the
implementing agency are also constraints to be considered when analyzing
the implementation of a policy directive. (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1981,
Easter, 1986)  Obviously, if organizational capabilities and/or financial
24resources are inadequate to successfully implement and enforce the policy,
objectives will not be met.
The how identifies the vehicle of enforcement, the "tool" of
implementation, e.g.,  voluntary contributions, licensing, permitting,
zoning, taxes, subsidies, prices, fines, etc.  (Easter, 1986).  An important
aspect of the  implementation process is the question of:  How are things
going to get done?.
"Many times no one asks the  questions:  What implementation tools
would be the most effective in encouraging adoption of the desired
resource management actions, and who should apply the tools?"
(Easter, 1986 p. 107)
To determine what  "most effective" means, some type of evaluative criteria
needs to be stipulated.  The concepts of efficiency and equity are
generally referred to.  Both concepts must be confined to a feasible set,
e.g.,  it may not be feasible to price a resource.  Within the set of
feasible alternatives, which provide essentially the same outcome, the
most efficient tool  is generally the one with the least cost.  In some
cases, it may even be possible to find an alternative that equates the
marginal  cost of implementation with the marginal  benefits.
Equity considerations are more difficult to define.  Equity would
dictate that all users get a fair return on their contribution to the
collective effort to regulate the commons (Oakerson, 1986).  To achieve
this, all rules should be implemented and enforced fairly to and among all
resource users.  Fairness, i.e, consistency in implementation across all
users is required to form positive expectations among users.  This  feeling
of reciprocity depends on expectations and these expectations must be
formed overtime through user/rule and user/user interaction.  If negative
25expectations are established through the institutional arrangements, i.e.,
I abide by the rules, but you do not, therefore I will not abide by the
rules when given a choice;  freeriding and resource degradation can be
expected.  Thus implementing management rules equitably is not only
desirable from a social perspective but is also necessary if positive
expectations between commons' users are to be formed.
Results of Implementation:  Procedures, Organization, Regulation
As results from the implementation process do not always resemble
proposed or intended results, the implemented commons' rules need to be
compared for consistency with the proposed rules  identified in the third
component of this framework.  Three scenarios may occur:  1)  the  results
will not deviate from intended effects, 2) the results will deviate
marginally from intended effects and no change may be needed, or 3) results
deviate from intended effects such that reimplementation  is necessary.
The analysis of this component will focus on the procedures, organization
and regulation decisions of the implementors  (implementing agencies) to
determine whether the results of implementation deviate from intended
institutions promulgated in the Charter.  The analysis of this component
need not be retrospective, it can be prospective and prescriptive as well.
The Decision to Abide by the Implemented Institutional Arrangements
The decision to abide by rules will be a function of the expectations
of actions by other users  (assurance), and the expected benefits and costs
associated with others contributing.  These expectations are based on the
commons' rules.  The actual rules are a function of the process of their
26implementation.  The objective of the res communes managers is to formulate
and implement rules such that the management objectives are fully attained.
To attain management objectives, rules must be promulgated and the rules
must be implemented successfully such that the decision to abide by the
rules is made by a critical mass.
Outputs of the Institutional Arrangements
The outputs of the entire process are determined by the promulgated
institutional arrangements, the implementation of those rules and the
summation of individual user decisions to abide by the rules.  This final
component involves analyzing the outputs of the entire process.  When the
analysis shows output below expectations, three basic questions should be
addressed.  Do the implemented rules structure expectations and incentives
to ascertain enough rule compliance to achieve management goals?  Do
outputs internalize externalities?  Are expectations of reciprocity and
assurance fostered overtime?  The problem may also lie in the actual rules
themselves, perhaps a lack of understanding of the underlying causal  theory
linking the rule changes to behavioral changes.  Or, the problem may lie in
the implementation process, perhaps the implementors have no interest in or
disagree with the management objectives.  Thus once outputs or expected
outputs are found to fall short of goals, the reasons for the shortfall
should be determined.
ANALYSIS OF THE GREAT LAKES COMMONS
The problem of formulating and implementing commons'  management rules
is not unique to the Great Lakes.  The presented framework is broad enough
27to analyze the implementation of commons' management rules for most res
nullis resources.  The purpose of the following analysis is two-fold:  1) to
verify the framework and 2) to analyze the newly promulgated Great Lakes
management rules during implementation.
The uniqueness of the Great Lakes commons results from the vast nature
of the resource and the somewhat arbitrary geopolitical boundaries humans
have defined around it.  Any common management rules promulgated for the
Great  Lakes  will  be constrained by international,  federal and
state/provincial  laws.  The promulgation of Public Law 99-662, granting
Great Lakes states governors veto power over any proposed diversion out of
the Great Lakes can be seen as the result of states seeking assurance from
the Federal Government.  Since paramount federal authority subjugates state
authority  in  like  matters,  the states sought and obtained  assurance  from
Congress that congressional approval of a diversion out of the Great Lakes
basin would not be granted without approval by the Great Lakes states.
The Public Law will only be invoked in the case of diversion out of
the Great Lakes basin.  Because the Public Law is binding and grants
virtual veto power to each Great Lakes governor for any new diversion out
of the Great Lakes basin,  the riparian states should be assured that no
unwanted diversion will occur without their approval.  Still,  the Public
Law does not pertain to intrabasin diversions nor to consumptive uses
although it does represent the Federal authority governing matters of
diversion out of the basin.
28Implementation of the Great Lakes Charter
The Sociopolitical Environment and Target Group/Resource Characteristics
Changes in socioeconomic conditions, perceived rising demand for
Great Lakes water, and changes in the institutional arrangements,  forced
states to reevaluate the institutional structures  for managing water
withdrawals from the Great Lakes.  The rights structure of the Great Lakes
did not allow the states to use police power to prohibit interstate
transfers, or regulate consumptive uses.  Any entity could withdraw water
from the Lakes without much consideration or notification of others.  For
the Lakes, the water withdrawals can be conceptualized either as rival,
with noncompensated interdependencies  (externalities) or as a congestible
good, with the cost of congestion broadly defined to encompass costs
accruing to other uses such as navigation, hydropower and the Basin's
ecosystem.  The rival/externality framework is used since  it does not
require recognition of prior rights and is  less restrictive.
The target group, those effected by the rules, can be conceptualized
as all current and all prospective water withdrawers.  This group, although
quite diverse, is easily identifiable.  The states are also effected by
management rules and can be considered as one of the target groups.
Indirectly, they reap secondary benefits from entities that consume water,
e.g.,  in taxes.  Thus, the states or more specifically the political
leaders of the states, have a distinct interest in the commons' rules and
their implementation.
If states are one of the target groups, they also are the policy
makers  (at least the elected officials) and the implementors of the policy
(state agencies).  Since a distinction is made between the target groups
29and the implementors, the analysis must be done at two levels:  the
state/state and the state/withdrawer level.  For the state/state analysis,
the implementation collapses to one of promulgating the new access rules
and deciding, as a member of the commons, to abide by the new access rules.
In the state/withdrawer analysis, the full framework applies but only to
those states that have decided to implement the comnnons' rules.  The
analysis will proceed by component as depicted in Table 2.  The state/state
relationship will be analyzed first followed by the state/withdrawer
analysis.
State/State Analysis
Formation of Institutional Arrangements
The management objectives embodied in the Charter are quite clear.
They focus on conserving the levels and flows of the Great Lakes and on
protecting  and  conserving  the  Basin  ecosystem.  One  could  interpret  this
language  as  the  management's  desire  to prevent  resource  degradation.
Above, it was demonstrated that to prevent resource degradation of an open
access resource, externalities had to be internalized.  For the Great
Lakes, to conserve the levels and flows, externalities caused by water
withdrawals must be internalized.  Other stated objectives include:  making
secure and protecting present developments within the region and providing
for future investment and development in the region.
Thus the Charter's management objective is to conserve lake levels and
provide for future development.  Presumably, future development will entail
water withdrawals from the Lakes.  The two objectives, conservation and
development need not be at odds.  However, at some Lake level further water
30withdrawals will damage the Lake ecosystem and associated economic
activities.
The underlying spirit of the Charter is cooperation.  The answer to
the open access problem promulgated within the Charter is cooperative
regulation, with regulation conceived as a permitting authority.  A
permitting authority grants the state the right to deny access to the Lake
Waters and to stipulate the rate of water withdrawal from the Lakes.  The
permit allows the state to control the aggregate level of water withdrawals
within the state.  For large scale withdrawals  (> 5,000,000 gpd in any 30
day period) the prior notice and consultation  (PNC) process will be
initiated.  Through the PNC process, the states plan to cooperatively
manage and regulate the total level of water withdrawals  incurred through
consumptive uses and diversions.  However, because the process is non
binding, the state where the withdrawal occurs makes the final decision.
Thus externalities,  incurred by others from changes in the Lake levels, may
not be internalized, particularly when development within a state receives
high priority relative to conservation objectives.
The Decision to Abide by Institutional Arrangements
For the states, the focus is on the decision to abide by (implement)
the  institutional arrangements.  Abiding by or implementing the
arrangements would entail legislating the authority:  1) to collect/register
data for any water withdrawal in excess of 100,000 gpd in any thirty day
period,  2) to regulate any new or increased diversion or consumptive use
in excess of 2,000,000 gpd in any thirty day period, and 3) to require
notification and consultation of all Great Lakes states/provinces of any
31new or increased diversion or consumptive use in excess of 5,000,000 gpd in
any thirty day period.  Implementation also includes providing data on
withdrawals to a regional data collection agency.
As stated, the decision to abide by the rules  is based on expected
contributions of others  (decision to implement) and expected benefits and
costs of abiding by the rules.  Benefits of implementation would include
the ability to register and regulate water withdrawals, i.e.,  collect data
on water withdrawal effects, stipulate rate of water use and deny access if
desired, and provide for a systematic development of the water resources.
Costs would include legislative costs, political costs of supporting
legislation, regulatory costs, operations costs, and loss of secondary
benefits that might occur when some entity is denied water as a result of
the process.
The decisions of political leaders in each state to implement the
Charter rules are  summarized in Table 3.  The decision to implement should
not  be  confused  with  the actual  implementation  of the  rules.  Reasons
abound for draft legislation  (the decision to implement) which is never
enacted.
To date, five states  (Illinois, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, and
Wisconsin) have drafted legislation to implement the Charter.  In New York,
Assembly Bill 6257 was defeated in the General Assembly in 1987.  The Bill
would have implemented all of the Charter's requirements;  a new bill is
expected  to  be drafted  in  the  near  future  (Tobe 11/9/87).  In  Ohio,
legislation  to  implement  the Charter's  provisions  will  be  introduced at  the
end  of  November  1987  (Bartz  11/9/87).  In  contrast,  Illinois,  Minnesota,
32and Wisconsin have successfully enacted legislation to modify their
existing authority to meet the Charter's provisions.
Neither Indiana nor Pennsylvania have drafted legislation to implement
the Charter.  Government officials  in  both  states  do  not  expect  any  such
legislation  (Hebbenstreit,  11/9/87;  Hoffman,  11/10/87).  Perhaps  the
legislative,  political,  and  regulatory  costs  of  implementing the Charter
outweigh the benefits of regulating such a relatively small coastline.
Michigan is the anomaly of the eight states.  Any interbasin  transfer
Michigan would or could approve of,  would  have to go outstate  (except  for  a
small stretch, z  2 miles, in the southwestern corner).  All states
bordering Michigan are Great Lakes states, making it difficult for Michigan
to export Great Lakes water out-of-basin or out-of-state.  However,
Michigan has the longest coast line of any Great Lakes state and is
virtually surrounded by the Great Lakes.  Arguably, Michigan would have the
most to lose from lowering Lake  levels in periods of low Lake levels and
the most to gain by lowering Lake levels in times of high Lakes levels
(mitigating shoreline damages).  Currently, Michigan has not drafted any
legislation to implement the Charter's provisions15 .
Outputs of the Institutional Arrangements
Do the  implemented rules structure expectations and incentives to
ascertain enough rule compliance to achieve management goals?  Does the
15All of the states that have not yet implemented the Charter's
provisions are expected to abide by the agreement.  Excluding the newly
elected governor of Pennsylvania, all of the governors of the states that
have not implemented the Charter's provisions, signed the Charter
agreement.  However, one cannot be certain that ensuing governors will
abide by past promises without legislation.
33nonbinding cooperative regulation process internalize externalities to
prevent overinvestment and/or resource degradation?  To provide a complete
answer to these questions, the analysis must be extended to the
state/withdrawer relationship.
State/Withdrawer Analysis
Formation of Institutional Arrangements
The institutional arrangements for this part of the analysis are the
rules which have been successfully enacted by the state legislatures.  The
language enacted is identical to the Charter's, including the objectives.
The analysis focuses on Illinois, Minnesota, New York and Wisconsin.16 New
York is included even though the proposed legislation did not pass the New
York General Assembly.
Implementation of Institutional Arrangements
How the legislation passed,  what political trading took place, etc,  is
beyond the scope of this paper and best left to a political scientist.
Thus the focus  is on the who and the how of the implementation process.
Both are summarized in Table 4,
All of the agencies designated to implement the institutional
arrangements are established agencies, i.e,  no new agencies were created.
The fact that the DNR or equivalent agencies have been designated as the
16At the time of analysis a copy of Ohio's draft legislation had not
been received, otherwise it also would have been included.
34TABLE  3:  Summary  of  State's  Implementation  of  the  Charter
Illinois  IN  MI  MN  NY  OH  PA  WI
-_  Before  Present|  B  P  B  P'  B  P  B  P  PB  P  B  P
Ability  to  register  any  water
withdrawal  from  the  Great  Lakes
>  100,000  GPD  Yes  Yes  Y  Y  N  N  Y  Y  N  N  Y  Y  Y  Y  N  Y
Ability  to  manage  or  regulate
water  division  >
2  million  GPD  from  G.L.  Yes  Yes  N  N  N  N  Y  N  N  YY  Y  Y
Ability  to  manage  or
regulate  a  consumptive  use  1  7  7
2 mlli  ongpdfromG.L.  No  Yes  N  N  N  N  Y  Y  N  N  N  N  Y  Y  N  Y >  2  million  gpd  from  G.L.
Legislative  language  requiring
notification  for  a  water
withdrawal  >  5  million  gpd.  No  No  N  N  N  N  N  Y  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  Y
Meets  charter  eligibility
requirements  for  PNC prequirementos  N  NC  N  N  Yes  N  N  N  N  N  N  N  Y process
2Change occurred under Level of Lake Michigan Act  1984.
Legislative language requires approval of all other Great Lakes states for a diversion only.
3  approval notification would be  required.
4Since 1983,  under  Indiana Code 13-2-6.1.
5Enabling Legislation passed 1987, H.F. 1507,  Chp  159.
Draft legislation, Assembly Bill 6257,  would have implemented all  facets of  Charter, defeated
Assembly  1987. 6
Ohio  S.B.  360,  passed  in 1983-1984 session.
gSince  1939,  for Public Water Supplies only.
Wisconsin Act 60,  enacted  1985.
B =  Before 1983;  P =  present  (December 1987)
For
in  Generalimplementing agency instead of the Departments of Commerce, suggests a
conservation orientation by the state politicians regarding the Lakes.17
Organizational capabilities and financial resources should not be a
limiting factor.  All of the agencies have prior experience in issuing
permits and adequate resources to do the job.
The implementation tools are registration and permitting.  With
registration the state does not deny or approve water withdrawals.  The
permit, however, could establish authority to:
- suspend, modify, grant or deny a permit  (access)
- establish withdrawal  rates (rate of use)
- require periodic reporting
- require metering devices and water  conservation
- require a processing fee
- determine priority of appropriation among users
- specify the duration of the permit
(Maxwell and Waelti,  1978)
The  permit  system serves several important purposes.  The permit
system for water withdrawals places water rights under executive
regulation.  Water rights are defined, but by a state regulatory agency.18
The permit system allows the state to control the aggregate level of
permitted withdrawals out of  state  waters.  If all the states implement the
permit system at the specified trigger levels, the states believe that the
total aggregate level of permittable withdrawals from the Great Lakes can
be regulated.  That is, the PNC process is perceived as a medium to
cooperatively manage future development.
'7IDOT,  the exception, was appointed in 1964 as the regulatory agency
of Lake Michigan withdrawals in Illinois.
1sThis was the sticking point for New York's proposed legislation.
(Tobe 11/9/87)
36The open access problem of externality is not internalized by the
permit system as currently implemented.  No limit is set on the number of
permits issued nor on the total amount of water withdrawals.  A permit
issuing state will notify and consult with other states.  But given the
incongruent nature of conservation and development and the predisposition
of elected officials to promote development within their state, it  is
likely that the current rules will not suffice to achieve conservation nor
to prevent overuse of the resource.  From an efficiency standpoint the
permit system has appealing potential, however, since the permits as
structured do not internalize externalities, they are not efficient.
The permit system, at first glance, would seem to be quite fair,
i.e.,  equitable.  When implemented, the permit applies to every one in the
state desiring to consume water in excess of established trigger levels.
However, equity would also dictate that an appropriator filing for a permit
would have a similar chance of receiving the permit whether they file in
Minnesota or New York, i.e.,  the permit should be consistent across
states. 20 Table 5 summarizes permit approval criteria for the four states.
The language of the approval criteria is,  at best, ambiguous.  How the
different agencies will interpret "reasonable" and "consistent" for example
will vary between agencies.  The only criteria that is common to all four
states  is public health, safety and welfare.  This criteria is a direct
outgrowth of the state's police power which is exercised to preclude the
creation of public harm.  Only Illinois includes reasonable and beneficial
use as one of the criteria.  In general, the varying criteria between
20This becomes especially critical  if permits are transferable across
state lines.
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Permit required for any sized
diversion and for any c.u. >
2,000,000 gpd.
Permit  for any  water  withdrawal
>  10,000  gpd  or >  100,000  gpy.
Registration for any water
withdrawal  > 100,000 gpd.
Permit for any c.u. >  2,000,000
gpd.  and  a  permit  for  any sized
water diversion
Registration for  any  water
withdrawal  >  100,000 gpd.
Permit  required  for  any c.u.
and  diversion  >  2,000,000  gpd.
Source:  Personal interviews with State Water Policy Personnel.
c.u.  =  consumptive use
gpd  =  gallons  per  day
gpy  =  gallons per year
19Draft legislation 6257, defeated in General Assembly 1987.
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Statesstates and the ambiguous language of the permits, could mean that permit
approval will not be inconsistent between states.  Although the
discrepancies may not be large, the differences could lead to an
undermining of cooperation, i.e.,  reciprocity overtime.  If a state
suspects another of having "loose"  or "easy" approval criteria and,
therefore, not contributing adequately to the management goal of
conservation, it may adjust its own criteria to facilitate "easier"
approval.  This may foster negative expectations among states.
To summarize, agencies sympathetic to the management goal of
conservation with adequate organizational capabilities and financial
resources have been designated as implementors/administrators of the
management rules in three Great Lakes states.  However, as implemented, the
permits are inadequate for internalizing externalities and fostering mutual
expectations of reciprocity overtime.  The fault lies within the
promulgated institutional arrangements of the Charter, as the proposed
system gives no incentive to states to stop issuing permits or to establish
an over all maximum level of withdrawals.  Also, the process has instituted
ambiguous permit criteria that are not consistent across states.  The
inconsistency may result in negative expectations and undermine
cooperation.  This may be a fault of the implementation process,
alternatively, it may be attributable to the desire by states to retain
their sovereignty in establishing permit approval criteria.
The Results of Implementation:  Procedures, Organization, Regulation
Do results of the implementation process deviate from the intended
39effects desired by the Charter's drafters?  The answer would have to be
nofor those states that have implemented the Charter's rules thus far.
Illinois,  Minnesota and Wisconsin have implemented the Charter's rules
faithfully.  This may be attributed to the fact that the policy formulators
had a keen interest in implementing the policy and were involved in both
policy formulation and implementation.
Decision to Abide by the Implemented Institutional Arrangements
Are the rules structured to facilitate the decision to abide by the
institutional arrangements?  The individual resource users will base their
decision on the state's implemented rules.  If the state decides to
implement the Charter's rules, the state can structure financial penalties
for withdrawing water without a permit to exceed the cost of purchasing a
permit or registering the withdrawal.  The decision by a rational
individual withdrawer will then be to abide by the rules and full
compliance is attainable2l. The crucial decision to determine whether
management objectives are attained lies not with the individual resource
user but with the states decision to abide by (implement) the Charter.  The
state decision is the important initial decision, as it is voluntary.  The
analysis thus, returns to the final component, where the state/state
relationship analysis left off.
21Wisconsin already has issued permits for withdrawals under its
permitting authority. (Shea  Wisconsin, 1987)  Minnesota and Illinois had
been issuing permits for surface water withdrawals before 1983.  Thus
withdrawer compliance can be expected.
40Table 5:  Permit Approval Standards
rne uonsumptive Use or  ILL.
Diversion must:
1)  be of reasonable and beneficial use  X
2)  incorporate reasonable conservation  X
practices
3)  be consistent with public health,  X
safety and welfare of the state
4)  have legislative approval
5)  not conflict with future water resource
needs
6)  enough available water must be in
proposed area
7)  be  consistent  with  State  and other  water
management  plans
8)  not  conflict  with competing users
9)  not have a significant adverse impact  on
the  environment  and ecosystem  of  the
Great  Lakes
10)  not adversely effect public water rights in




















'New  York  draft  legislation,  Assembly  Bill  6257,  did not  pass  Assembly  in
1987.
2For all c.u. and diversion >  2,000,000 gpd except for those pertaining to
domestic water supplies, irrigation and agricultural processing.
Source:  Personal Interviews  of State  Water  Policy  personnel  and State
documentation.
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r  F-  ^  · - - - -Outputs of the Institutional Arrangements
What behavior might one expect as a result of the promulgated and
implemented access rules?  Expectations of cooperation and reciprocity are
currently high among the states.  There is a strong unified cooperative
spirit 'among  the basin states to prevent interbasin transfers of water out
of the Great Lakes states.  Given this cooperative spirit and the Public
Law, the promulgated rules may be effective in preventing interbasin water
diversions out of the Great Lakes.  Certainly, given the federal veto power
any interstate, interbasin diversion may be particularly difficult to
accomplish.  But the Public Law does not pertain to consumptive uses nor to
intrabasin transfers and, here, management rules may fall short of
achieving goals.  The Charter and implemented state management rules do not
internalize externalities that occur when Lake levels drop due to water
withdrawals.  Because of the conflicts between conservation and development
and the fact that no provisions exist to internalize externalities, overuse
and overinvestment  from within the Basin are likely to occur.  At some
point the overuse and overinvestment may begin to erode existing
cooperation.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Unregulated open access resources typically suffer from
overinvestment, overexploitation and eventual degradation.  The theory of
open access resources demonstrates the need for their management, where
management rules can be constructed to facilitate either a  "private" or a
"public" solution.
42The  Great  Lakes  basin  is  an  enormous, complexly  integrated,
interjurisdictional  commons.  With respect to consumptive water use, the
basin was essentially an open access resource prior to the promulgation of
the Great Lakes Charter and P.L. 99-662.  Changes in institutional
arrangements, the Sporhase and El Paso court decisions, combined with
changing socio-economic conditions forced state political leaders to
promulgate and implement rules to manage the Great Lakes basin with respect
to water withdrawals.
Undoubtedly, the intent of political leaders from the Basin states and
provinces is not to manage all withdrawals but only to protect the basin
against unwanted interstate diversion.  However, given the constraints
placed on legislative water management by the Sporhase and El Paso court
decisions, management rules have to be broadened to include all withdrawals
from the Basin.  Because the basin encompasses international,  federal, and
state/provincial jurisdictions, state political leaders are pursuing
management rules at the U.S. federal and the state/provincial  level.
The Great Lakes Charter is a positive first step towards basin
management.  The common property nature of the Great Lakes is recognized
within the Charter.  All commons' members are involved in management
decisions that significantly alter Lake levels or water quality.  The
recognition by political leaders  in the Great Lakes region that the Great
Lakes basin is a commons,  implies that it should be managed as such.
Management of a commons requires management rules to be applied
consistently to all users to develop expectations of reciprocity and
assurance.  In addition the rules should internalize externalities.  On
43both of these counts the Great Lakes Charter, as promulgated and
implemented, fails.
The implementation tool, the permit, is not consistent between or
among states.  Approval criteria vary between states and are vague and
ambiguous.  Also, the permit system as designed does not internalize
externalities, i.e.,  permits do not take into account Lake level
fluctuations.  Because of the inherent goal conflicts within the Charter
between conservation and development, no incentive exists within the permit
system or the prior notice and consultation (PNC) process for a state to
discontinue issuing permits.
Because Lake levels have been high  (1980-1986),  the fact that permits
may not be consistent between states or do not internalize externalities
has not concerned policy makers.  But the Lakes are dynamic, i.e.,  Lake
levels fluctuate.  In fact, a significant drop occurred in 1987.  The
ability to regulate water withdrawals by permit will become important as
Lake levels recede or withdrawals increase.  The current role of the
permits is one of gathering information about withdrawals.  If states and
provinces simply desire to collect information, registration would
accomplish this goal and would be more cost effective.  As the regulatory
role of permits increases, the shortfalls  inherent in their structure will
become more apparent and important.  If states and provinces desire to
manage the basin with respect to water withdrawals, changes in the permits
need to be considered.  To this end, evolution towards a transferable and
divisible permit would be a  positive next step.
44Recommendations
Management rules for water withdrawals from the  Great  Lakes  Basin  need
to  recognize:
- the  unified system  of  lakes  and  their  interdependencies.
- the  political,  common property  nature  of the  basin.
- the states  and provinces  desire  to  manage  the  Lakes  as  opposed  to
federal  or  international  regulation.
- the  political  significance  attached  to  secondary  benefits  captured  by
the  states  or provinces  from  entities  consuming  water  within  their
jurisdiction.
- the  need  to  be  consistent  and  fair overtime  to  form  expectations  of
reciprocity  and  assurance  among all  commons'  members.
- the  need  to  internalize  externalities  associated  with  water
withdrawals.
The  current  permitting  system as  implemented  in  Illinois,  Minnesota,  and
Wisconsin and proposed in New York recognizes the first four of these
points.  A transferable,  divisible  permit,  if  structured  properly  would
achieve  all  six points.
A transferable permit establishes a property right for the permit
holder  to  consume  a  certain  amount  of  water.22  Once  the  permit  has  been
granted,  it  may  be  transferred  among  entities  as a property right,  i.e.,
the  permit  is  not  an  appurtenance  to  land.  Examples of  transferable  permit
markets  are:  BOD  discharge  permits,  taxi  cab  medallions,  and  liquor
licensing  (Hahn,  1983).
The transferable permit system for water withdrawals from the Great
Lakes  commons  requires  the definition  of  a  minimum  Lake  level  (MLL)  . The
MLL would  represent  the  minimum  desired  Lake  level.  Creating  a  MLL
standard would remove the ability to continue to issue permits indefinitely
22Permits should be defined as a consumptive use, not as a withdrawal,
to facilitate the determination of externalities associated with the actual
water loss  (Johnson and Gisser,  1981).  Also, to achieve water quality
goals,  discharge quality could be included in the permits.
45since a maximum amount of water for withdrawals would be established.  The
MLL could be set based on the effects of withdrawals on other activities in
the Basin such as navigation, hydropower, and the Basin's ecosystem.
For Lake levels above the MLL, permits would be issued for the
difference between the Lake level and the MLL which will be called the
surplus.  The  number  of permits issued for the surplus would be fixed.
Once the surplus is allocated any entity desiring to withdraw water would
have to buy, rent, or lease permit shares from permit holders.  The permit
could include a priority ranking, where the priority rank is based either
on use, or time, or a combination of the two.  When Lake levels drop below
the MLL or some other predetermined level, the consumptive use right of a
permit would be reduced.  The amount of reduction in the use rate for each
permit would depend on the relative priority ranking of a permit and how
low the Lakes levels had fallen.  For example, a permit issued in  1900
might have priority over a permit issued in 1950 or a municipal use permit
may have priority over an industrial use permit.  As Lake levels fall  and
the surplus  is reduced, the price of the permit share should rise.  For
rising Lake levels, the price of a low priority permit would fall and could
approach zero at high surplus levels.
The definition of MLL must be an international decision for the Great
Lakes made by all commons' members and users.  The decision will
necessarily be hydrologic, economic, and political.  The agreed upon MLL,
by definition, will probably have to recognize prior rights such as the
Basin ecosystem, navigation, hydropower, and shoreline property owners.
The decision on the MLL should be designed to prevent degradation and
overuse, i.e.,  it should recognize the physical  limits of the Great Lakes
46and its ecosystem.  Basing the MLL on a long term average, for example, is
one possibility.  The MLL need not be fixed once and for all but should,
probably, be flexible and reevaluated periodically.
Permits would not have to be transferable within the entire Basin
since transferability within each lake would suffice.  The MLL could be
established  for  each  of  the five lakes separately, taking  into account
downstream  effects  for the  lakes  as  a  group.
If  permits  are  transferable, they should be consistent among states
with  identical  criteria  for approval.  Indeed,  a  state  might have other
states  represented  on  the  body  approving the states permit, i.e.,  the
Minnesota board approving Lake Superior permits might include members from
New York and Illinois as well as members from Wisconsin and Ontario.  All
states and provinces as a minimum should agree on the criteria for
approving permits.  Other decisions concerning permits that would have to
be made on an international  level would include:  1)  the basis for defining
permits such as quantity and quality of water and the type of use, 2) the
procedures for allocating and exchanging permits, 3) the duration and
number of permits to be issued, 4) restrictions on exchange,  5) the
arrangements for implementing the permit system, including what agency
issues the permits and who enforces and monitors compliance, and 6) the
division of permits among states (Eheart, et al.,  1983).
The recommendation to move towards a transferable, divisible permit is
intended to stimulate discussion of the permit system.  Obviously, the
discussion here is inadequate to highlight all of the advantages and
disadvantages of a transferable permit for Great Lakes water withdrawals.
47But  it does suggest a change in the current permit system and a direction
for that change.
Finally, conclusions regarding the implementation framework and the
role of implementation need to be drawn.  The framework for implementing
common property rules functioned reasonably well for the Great Lakes.  The
framework helped highlight the goal conflicts inherent in the Great Lakes
Charter and the  inadequacy of the permits.  Implementation of the Charter,
for Illinois, Minnesota, and Wisconsin appears to have been relatively
successful.  This is partly attributable to the high degree of interaction
of the implementors  in the policy formulation process.  The problems that
New York had in passing the Charter legislation through its General
Assembly may be indicative of the problems other states will have.
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